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Geostrategic	motivations	behind	the	BRI
After Xi Jinping’s announcements of the Silk Road Economic 
Belt and the Maritime Silk Road, which together go under the 
English name of “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR), also called the 
“Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), there has been much specula-
tion about the rationale behind that initiative1. The BRI aims at 
improving connectivity between Asia, Europe, and parts of Africa 
in five main areas: policy coordination, infrastructure construc-
tion, trade facilitation, financial integration and people-to-people 
exchanges. As thoroughly described in the previous chapters, im-
portant geo-political and strategic rationales are at work behind 
the BRI. In launching the BRI, China is determined to strength-
en its relationships with neighbouring countries in Central and 
Southeast Asia, while at the same time securing the support of 
regional powers, i.e. Russia, India, Japan, and South Korea, to 
the exclusion of the United States. However, most of the numer-
ous goals pursued by the initiative, according to official Chinese 
statements, refer to improving economic relations between Asia, 
Europe and Africa while at the same time forging a new growth 
driver for the domestic economy. In fact, the BRI aims at giving 
1 This chapter is an updated and revisited version of  A. Amighini, Belt and Road: A 
Game Changer in International Trade?, in Nomos & Khaos, 2017. 
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a comprehensive framework to many of the policy goals that the 
Chinese authorities have been pursuing over the last few years 
with the aim to address the various challenges the country faces 
both domestically and internationally. First of all, the BRI aims at 
searching for new export markets for Chinese production, most 
notably in Central Asian economies whose trade with China rose 
from US$1.8 billion in 2000 to US$50 billion in 2013 and are 
increasingly important sources of imports from China. Moreover, 
the BRI allows exporting not only goods, but also excess produc-
tive capacity in transport and infrastructure sectors, by building 
new railways and facilities abroad. A further goal of the whole ini-
tiative is to improve digital connectivity in Eurasia, so that China 
shall be connected to Central Asia and ideally Europe through dig-
ital besides traditional trade. Giving the renminbi an international 
stature is also a goal of the BRI, to expand trading and bond issu-
ance abroad. An important strategic goal is securing China’s en-
ergy supplies, currently imported mainly by sea through the South 
China Sea, notably an area with geopolitical tensions. On the do-
mestic side, contributing to internal economic rebalancing is also 
an objective of the BRI, whose overland routes start from inner 
provinces where economic and industrial development should has 
historically lagged behind compared to the rapid growth in coastal 
provinces. Last but not least, the BRI aims at reducing transport 
costs, which are particularly high for China’s trade compared to 
the world’s average. All of those goals now look strongly inter-
twined in the BRI, which has since become the core of China’s 
economic diplomacy (Figure 1). 
Looking for new export markets. Infrastructure development 
in countries along the Belt and Road routes will increase growth 
in their economies and thus contribute to a growing demand for 
China’s goods and services. Many of the Asian countries along the 
New Silk Roads are likely to become the next generation of emerg-
ing economies, with a strong potential for demand growth. Accord-
ing to the Industrialization of the Belt and Road Countries Report 
published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the BRI will 
extend across up to 65 countries, accounting for more than near-
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ly two-thirds of the world’s population, one-third of global GDP, 
75% of known global energy reserves and around one quarter of 
world merchandise trade. They already share good economic and 
trade relations with China, mainly in the form of exports of raw 
materials and natural resources 
in exchange for the import of 
manufactured goods. Therefore, 
reducing trade barriers and open-
ing up to new trade routes will 
likely increase bilateral trade 
with China. This explains why 
China’s president Xi Jinping, in 
March 2015, stated that annual 
trade with the countries along the 
Figure 1 - The Belt and Road Initiative compared 
to the old Silk Road main routes
Source: elaborated from Financial Times (2015)
the BRI aims at giving a 
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Belt and Road Initiative would double over the next 10 years, and 
surpass US$2.5 trillion by 2025. 
Vent for surplus to export overcapacity. The Chinese econ-
omy has grown increasingly dependent on domestic infrastructure 
investment, especially since 2009, when the global recession led to 
a reduction in foreign demand for Chinese exports, and Chinese au-
thorities intervened by increasing investment in the transport , in-
frastructure and real estate sectors, to compensate for the drop in 
manufacturing output. In 2014, that policy eventually became unsus-
tainable due to the saturation of domestic demand, and those sectors 
found themselves in dramatic overcapacity. In order to alleviate the 
problems created by excess capacity in the construction and associ-
ated sectors, Chinese construction companies are encouraged to look 
elsewhere for opportunities. This is a key motivation for the Belt 
and Road Initiative, and in fact Beijing expects that its own compa-
nies will plan, build, and supply the projects it funds. While OECD 
countries have committed to untying their development aid, Chinese 
financing institutions are still practising the so-called ‘tied lending’. 
For example, according to King and Wood Mallesons2: “For China-
sponsored infrastructure projects in developing regions such as Af-
rica, the China Development Bank (CDB), C-EXIM and Sinosure 
often structure the financing package, obtain export credit insurance 
and bring in Chinese companies to build the infrastructure. Many 
of their concessional loans are conditional upon Chinese enterprises 
being awarded construction or export contracts. For example, the 
CDB previously lent Nigeria US$200 million on condition that it 
was used to purchase products from Chinese telecoms giant Huawei. 
Loan conditions often require that 50% of loan proceeds be applied 
towards acquiring Chinese goods and services, although in Angola’s 
case the figure has reportedly exceeded 70%”. 
Improving digital connectivity. Part of the BRI is improving 
connectivity among the countries involved  by means of soft in-
2 L. Handel, L. Zhigang and T. Coles, Out of  China: The activities of  China’s export credit 
agencies and development banks in Africa, King & Wood Mallesons, http://www.kwm.
com/en/es/knowledge/insights/out-of-china-the-activities-of-chinas-export-credit-
agencies-and-development-banks-in-africa-20140723
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frastructure to create the so-called “digital Silk Road”, i.e. an In-
ternet community that would facilitate cross-border e-commerce 
and Internet banking. This is in fact one of the less discussed as-
pects of the New Silk Roads, perhaps because hard infrastruc-
ture investment has so far dominated projects and communica-
tion. According to Ren Xianliang, vice minister of the Cyberspace 
Administration of China, the digital Silk Road should be under-
taken in addition to implementing the country’s Internet Plus plan, 
whereby everything will be connected to a superfast broadband 
network3. One of the main obstacles to a digital Silk Road is the 
still high level of China’s services trade barriers, including licens-
ing requirements, complex regulations and product quotas4. As 
regards digital infrastructure, different standards, platforms and 
service providers are competing with one another to set the domi-
nant rules in the future.
International stature for the renminbi. China has set the 
goal of making the renminbi a global reserve currency. In 2015, 
it joined the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
and founded the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New 
Development Bank. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund 
added the renminbi to the basket of Special Drawing Rights cur-
rencies. The Chinese currency is increasingly used in loans and the 
infrastructure focus of BRI will further help increase the number of 
loans granted in renminbi. Moreover, some Middle Eastern coun-
tries along the New Silk Road have recently become offshore trad-
ing centres for the renminbi, such as Qatar, with clearing centres 
that also allow Panda bonds issuance. Significant growth in trade 
between China and the Arabian Gulf is helping to pave the way for 
Dubai to become another offshore trading centre for the Chinese 
currency. In this effort, China has the backing of Russia and other 
3 Liu Jia and Gao Shuan, “China, EU to promote digital Silk Road”, China Daily, http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-07/07/content_21202745.htm 
4 C. Bergsten, G.C. Hufbauer  and S. Miner, Bridging the Pacific: Towards Free Trade and 
Investment Between China and the United States, Washington, Peterson Institute for Inter-
national Economics, 2014, and https://www.oecd.org/trade/services-trade/STRI_
CHN.pdf
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emerging economies that share the goal of diminishing US dollar 
dominance, but whose currencies are too volatile to serve the same 
function. 
Securing energy supply. China’s geo-political strategy also 
has an important energy dimension. While the economic corridor 
serving China’s commercial expansion in foreign markets runs 
westward, an energy corridor unfolds east to west, from the Central 
Asian oil- and gas-producing republics to China. Turkmenistan, in 
particular, is currently the leading natural gas supplier, covering in 
2014 almost 50% of Chinese imports through the China-Central 
Asia gas pipeline opened in 2009. Energy demand has increased 
more than 500% since 1980, and China has become the world’s 
largest energy consumer and the second-largest oil consumer be-
hind the US. According to the International Energy Agency, China 
will need additional 6.6 million barrels per day (mbpd) of oil by 
2040, i.e. accounting for more than 20% of new demand (from 90 
mbpd in 2012 to 121 mbpd). Not only is China dependent on energy 
imports, but 90% of these imports travel through the near seas – the 
Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea (Figure 2). 
These are enclosed by the so-called “First Island Chain”, a series 
of islands that stretches from Japan to the Philippines to Indonesia, 
some of which are controlled by US allies. A strategic rationale of 
the BRI is to secure China’s energy supply through new pipelines in 
Central Asia and Russia as well as via Southeast Asia’s deep-water 
ports, thus reducing China’s dependence on US-secured choke-
points. Moreover, importing oil and commodities from the Middle 
East through the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, instead of through the 
South China Sea, reduces the distance travelled by 90%, which 
could yield very valuable economic benefits. 
Support China’s economic rebalancing. Domestically, the 
BRI will serve a major goal, i.e. giving greater  impetus to the long-
standing go west policies aimed at rebalancing economic develop-
ment between the industrialised coastal provinces and the inner 
provinces. Most of the growth potential for domestic demand is in 
the relatively underdeveloped inland provinces, where the central 
government aims to foster industrialisation by shifting manufactur-
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ing away from the coast. The BRI would link inland cities to global 
markets through a modern network of overland routes and energy 
pipelines, serving as alternatives to existing sea-lanes that cross the 
South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca. Geographic rebalanc-
ing will help resolve related macroeconomic imbalances between 
consumption and saving, because most of the consumption growth 
potential lies in the inner provinces.
Reducing trade costs. As the world’s biggest trading nation, 
China’s main interest is to reduce the transport costs of shipping 
its goods abroad, an important part of which is accounted for by 
time-to-destination. Therefore, not less importantly than other mo-
tivations presented above, the BRI aims at reducing transportation 
time and costs, considering that the EU is China’s main trade part-
ner. More specifically, the EU was China’s main import partner 
Figure 2 - China’s import transit routes and maritime chokepoints
Source: elaborated from Stratfor
128 China’s Belt and Road: a Game Changer?
in 2015, accounting for 12.5% of total Chinese imports, and the 
second largest export partner after the United States, as the des-
tination for 15.6% of Chinese exports. The vast majority of these 
exports (92.3% of the total value) currently travel by sea, leaving 
very little to air, rail and road transport (Figure 2). Similarly, China 
is the EU’s main import partner, providing 17.6% of total EU im-
ports, and the second largest export partner after the United States, 
accounting for 9.3% of total EU exports. Almost all EU exports to 
China (96.4% of total value) travel by sea. Currently, the average 
shipping time from China to European partners is 730 hours, 20% 
more than China’s average shipping time (about 610 hours, much 
longer than the world average of 406 hours). Switching to railway 
transport has great potential for saving transport time: according to 
data provided by GEFCO, infrastructure construction would reduce 
railroad travel time from China to Europe to 16-21 days (depending 
on departure and arrival location), compared to 37-45 days for sea 
freight, port-to-port (Figure 3)5.
As China currently faces higher-than- average shipping times 
and trimming them is an important goal of the projects funded with-
in the BRI, documentation for projects aiming to be approved under 
the umbrella mof the BRI must include statistics on the reduction 
in travel time and cost expected from project completion. Because 
such upgrading will affect all cargo plying these transport routes, 
the BRI is also of interest to countries beyond the designated Silk 
Road routes.
Impact	of	the	BRI	on	international	trade	
and	economic	relations
As one of the main goals of the BRI is to build new transport in-
frastructures, such as railways, highways, seaports, airports, etc., to 
connect China with Europe, the transport costs between China and 
5 The Yuxinou Railway, in particular, runs from Chongqing to Duisburg in Germany 
in only 288 hours. ‘East Wind’ travelled from Yiwu, south of  Shanghai, on January 1st 
2017 with 68 containers and reached London 16 days later. 
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Europe will be significantly reduced. Insofar as missing transport 
infrastructure acts as a major barrier to trade flows, especially for 
those countries where infrastructure facilities are more underdevel-
oped, the BRI’s most evident and direct impact will be on the size of 
trade among the countries covered by the initiative.  The implemen-
tation of the BRI should increase the flow of goods between China 
and Europe through the reduction of transport costs. This will apply 
to all bilateral trade in principle, that is, to both Chinese exports to 
Europe and European exports to China. Assuming the structure of 
trade follows the historical pattern, both imports and exports will 
increase. The consequences in terms of net effects on the size of 
the trade balance between Europe and China, currently showing a 
trade deficit for Europe, is uncertain. On the one hand, the increase 
in China’s exports of goods to Europe might have a negative impact 
Figure 3 - Railroad vs sea freight merchandise travel time 
from China to Europe
Source: elaborated from GEFCO
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on Europe’s net exports. However, this depends on whether there is 
still unexploited potential for Chinese goods on European markets. 
Considering that Chinese goods mostly compete on price and not 
on quality, the net effect could be an increase in demand for Chi-
nese goods in Europe. On the other hand, recent research shows that 
Chinese demand is more and more oriented towards foreign goods 
than domestic goods, and this will likely increase Chinese imports 
from Europe. Therefore, it is very important that European coun-
tries pursue reciprocity in market access with China together with 
the development of the BRI, so that bilateral trade relations do not 
grow biased to the detriment of European trade balance.
A further impact of the BRI will be on the routes of interna-
tional trade. Currently, 60% of China’s trade (in value, and a much 
Figure 4 -  Share of Chinese trade by transport mode
Source: Garcia-Herrero and Xu (2016) from China Customs data
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higher share in volume) travels by sea, due to the lower transport 
costs associated with international shipments compared to railway 
transport and to the lack of infrastructure for land transport across 
Central Asia (Figure 4). To the extent that infrastructure improve-
ment will change the relative cost of seaborne trade compared to 
shipment by railroad (i.e. it will make it cheaper to ply overland 
routes than use the current sea-lanes through the Malacca Straits), 
an additional impact of the BRI will be on the routes and transport 
modes of China’s foreign trade. 
The countries relying mainly on the export of raw commodities 
to China (which in turn is their most important trade partner) will 
not be satisfied with just increasing such business ties, especially 
given the recent drop in commodity prices. China has tried to allay 
these concerns by linking construction of Silk Road projects to in-
vestments in industries that potentially could export more to China, 
thus diversifying the host economies.
The dynamics of this relationship, however, are far from a win-
win situation. Many countries along the Silk Road (most notably 
in Central Asia) run a trade deficit with China, and should be con-
cerned that denser and better transportation links with China will 
result in an even more unbalanced trade balance. Trade between 
China and the five Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – has already grown dra-
matically since 2000. In particular, imports from China have grown 
much more rapidly than exports (mainly natural resources) from 
these countries, so that now the region has a growing trade deficit 
with China. Through the BRI, China now wants to build the roads 
and pipelines needed to ensure smooth access to the resources it 
imports from the region.
Although there is still no precise information about the cross-bor-
der infrastructure projects to be financed under the initiative, from 
the announcements made so far it is quite evident that most of them 
aim to increase the prospects for land connectivity between China 
and Europe. Transportation costs for bilateral China-Europe trade 
are significantly higher than the world’s average. This explains why 
in some high-tech sectors such as electronics international freight 
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forwarding agencies are already switching to railroad, e.g. HP is 
planning to rely solely on railway transport by 2017 for shipping 
its made-in-China PCs to Europe. This runs counter to recent trends 
and near-future expectations, and has prompted shipping agencies 
and major port authorities to redesign sea-lanes to reduce shipping 
times and improve the interconnectedness between the ports and the 
inland railway network. 
On the other hand, China’s average cost of shipping by sea to 
European countries is only US$922 for a 40-foot container, about 
half as much as China’s average shipping cost, while railway trans-
port is three times as expensive as maritime transport6. Therefore, 
switching to railway transportation entails a trade-off between time 
and cost. Given that it can lead to a large decrease in transit times 
and the fact that technology now allows for a reduction in railroad 
costs, the BRI has the potential to become a game changer in inter-
national trade by moving large volumes of commerce from sea to 
land lanes. 
Formulating scenarios is not easy, however. While economics 
acknowledges the importance of efficient and peaceful trade rela-
tions in global growth, the understanding of geographic patterns of 
international trade remains sketchy. The literature has extensively 
analysed the determinants of individual countries’ access to inter-
national markets and bilateral trade flows, and has found support 
for the hypothesis that trade and infrastructure costs are important, 
but not the choice of transport modes, let alone the efficiency of 
the global network of trade routes. Furthermore, it is widely ac-
knowledged that in choosing among alternative modes, firms con-
sider predictability in transport costs a valuable feature. Therefore, 
a further element that can affect the trade-off between cost and time 
in different transport modes is the high volatility of sea freight rates 
compared to rail tariffs. This is because sea freight rates depend 
on the overall trade volumes much more than rail tariffs, which is 
why sea freight rate volatility has increased dramatically since the 
6 DB Schenker,  Rail based transports between China and Europe, International Chamber of  
Commerce, 2012, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Data/Documents/Transport-
and-logistics/6-Rail-based-transports-between-China-and-Europe/
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beginning of the world trade slowdown associated with the recent 
economic crisis since 2009.
Investment in infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative 
will increase maritime connectivity and lead to major trade-creating 
effects. Moreover, international cooperation and partnerships with 
the financing institutions related to the BRI will make it possible 
for countries to afford the financial outlays required by infrastruc-
ture investment, something that they are unable to do individually. 
International cooperation is also required to create incentives for 
shipping companies to serve destinations that are currently not prof-
itable7. Besides building infrastructure to improve land routes, the 
BRI also aims at intensifying trade along existing sea-lanes as well 
as improving access to the sea for land-locked countries. 
Maritime connectivity is particularly important because mari-
time transport is at the core of international trade in merchandise8. 
According to UNCTAD, around 80% of the volume of goods traded 
in the world travels by sea9.  
Maritime transport has become the dominant mode of transport 
in international trade following what has been called “the effects 
of the container revolution on world trade”10, i.e. an exponential 
intensification of containerised transport services. Containerisation 
allows exporters and importers from far away countries to trade 
with each other, even when individual trade transactions are not 
large enough to justify bearing the cost of individual shipments. 
Today, global container shipping services allow all countries to be 
connected to each other, either directly or indirectly, through tran-
shipment services, facilities and hubs. Containerisation has been 
the single most important revolution in world trade over the last 20 
years, with cumulative effects on trade creation that are much larger 
7 M. Fugazza, Maritime connectivity and trade, Policy issues in international trade and com-
modities,  Research Study Series no. 70, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2015.
8 M. Fugazza (2015).
9 UNCTAD,  Transport Newsletter #38, March 2008
10 D.M. Bernhofen, Z. El-Sahli and R. Kneller, Estimating the effects of  the container revolu-
tion on world trade, CESifo Working Papers no. 4136. CESifo, Center for Economic 
Studies and Ifo Institute, 2013.
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than GATT membership; with regard to North-North trade, contai-
nerisation increased trade by 790%, more than twice the effect of 
GATT membership (285%)11. 
With the exception of China, developing countries are still far 
below their potential in terms of connectivity, particularly mari-
time connectivity, with only half of the average number of direct 
maritime connections (i.e. without transhipments) of developed 
countries. This situation persists, despite their growing share in 
seaborne trade, which rose from 18% to 56% of the world total 
between 1970 and 2010, according to UNCTAD12. Recent literature 
has emphasised the importance of maritime transport connectivity 
and logistics performance (most notably, ports efficiency) as very 
important determinants of bilateral trade costs 13. Together they are 
a more important source of variation in trade costs than geographi-
cal distance, particularly for trade relations involving developing 
countries. Fugazza has recently found that the existence of a direct 
maritime connection (and not simply of maritime connectivity per 
se) plays an important role in determining trade costs14. The ab-
sence of a direct connection is associated with a drop in exports 
value of 55% and any additional transhipment is associated with a 
drop in exports value of 25%.
Trade creation along the Belt and Road will occur through two 
major channels: on the one hand, through the expansion of trade 
ties between pairs of countries that are already important trade 
partners, facilitated by the decrease of transport costs and trade 
barriers; on the other hand, through new trade routes that will un-
lock potential trade ties among hitherto mutually isolated trading 
partners.
11 Ibid.
12 UNCTAD, Review of  Maritime Transport, Geneva, United Nations, 2013.
13 J.F. Arvis, Y. Duval and C. Utoktham, Trade costs in the developing world: 1995-2010, 
Policy Research Working Paper Series no. 6309, The World Bank, 2013.
14 M. Fugazza (2015).
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Densifying	the	main	routes	of	China’s	trade
The main trade creation effect of the BRI will work through the reduc-
tion in transportation costs (especially railway and maritime), which 
should boost trade both between China and Europe and among Belt 
and Road transit countries, especially the landlocked ones. As there 
is no comprehensive information available on the improvements to 
infrastructure or the construction of new infrastructure, it is difficult 
to estimate how much transportation costs will be reduced. One re-
cent study by Garcia-Herrero and Xu used information on the few fi-
nalised projects15, such as the Yuxinou Railway (from Chongqing to 
Duisberg), which allows a 50% reduction in transportation time16. In 
the case of maritime transport, the cost savings stem from increased 
port efficiency, of which only a few examples already exist, such as 
the Qingdao port, where transportation costs are expected to decrease 
by about 5%. Accordingly, the authors apply a 50% reduction in 
railway transport costs and 5% reduction in sea transportation costs 
over the whole area covered by the project and estimate that a 10% 
reduction in transportation costs throughout the BRI countries will 
foster an increase in trade by 1.3%. While the exercise is interesting, 
these estimates are severely bi-
ased in at least two important 
aspects. First, it is very arbi-
trary to generalise that there 
will be a similar reduction in 
transport costs for all bilateral 
trade relations throughout the 
countries involved, even more 
so when such a wide gap ex-
ists between the improvements 
across land and sea-lanes. Sec-
15 A. Garcia-Herrero and J. Xu, China’s belt ND Road initiative: can Europe expect trade 
gains?, Bruegel Working Paper No. 5, 2016.
16 According to a declaration by Chongqing’s mayor in 2015 which is in line with the 
reduction in transportation time from 17-18 days to 12-13 days reported by the Yuxi-
nou official website and official Chinese media outlets.
Trade creation along the Belt 
and Road will occur through 
two major channels: through the 
expansion of trade ties between 
pairs of countries that are already 
important trade partners, through 
new trade routes that will unlock 
potential trade ties among 
hitherto mutually isolated trading 
partners
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ond, building new road and railway infrastructure could divert some 
trade from sea-lanes to land routes. 
Whatever the precise figure might be, Italy holds a strategic po-
sition in the overall BRI as a terminal point in southern Europe. 
Several major port authorities in China have been actively looking 
for partnerships with Italian counterparts. For example, the Shang-
hai-Basel shipping time would be reduced by an estimated time of 
seven days (out of an average shipping time of 40 days), by travel-
ling through either the Adriatic or the Tyrrhenian sea to the north of 
Italy, instead of travelling to Rotterdam through Gibraltar, and this 
could significantly alter the relative convenience between rail and 
sea trade. In this regard, an improvement in Italian port efficiency 
and interconnectedness between the ports and the inland railway 
network would significantly increase the chances that seaborne 
trade maintains some attractiveness compared to railway transport 
in the trade-off between time and cost.
Expanding trade ties across Eurasia
A further trade-creation effect is likely to take place through new 
trade routes that will unlock potential trade ties with new trading 
partners. The most unexploited potential trade seems to be between 
Central Asian countries and their largest neighbouring economies, 
i.e. China and Europe. Central Asia is a fast-growing emerging 
region, with promising demographic (with a projected 4.45% of 
world population by 2030) and economic prospects (4% average 
GDP growth projected through 2017) (World Bank Global Eco-
nomic Prospects). Poor connectivity and expensive logistics rank 
high in the list of factors that act as obstacles to growth, because all 
of the countries (except Pakistan) are land-locked. Pakistan has in 
fact the highest potential, and its economy is projected to become 
16% larger than Italy’s by 2050 according to PWC. At the other ex-
treme, Uzbekistan is one of the only two countries in the world that 
are “double landlocked”, i.e. surrounded entirely by one or more 
landlocked countries and requiring the crossing of at least two na-
tional borders to reach a coastline. 
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As already indicated, improving infrastructure across Central Asia 
would increase connectivity and will allow the region to exploit 
further trade potential with both China and the EU, its main trading 
partners. Currently, the EU shows much higher import and export 
values than China’s trade with the region (Figures 5 and 6), but the 
STANs’ imports from China have been growing very rapidly since 
2010, so the region’s trade balance with China has progressively 
deteriorated. Better infrastructure will intensify trade with China, 
with the STANs selling fairly similar goods and therefore expected 
to face even stronger competition with one another in the region 
in the future. This is partly a source of concern for the STANs as 
a group, as it could lead to an excessive dependence on China for 
consumption and capital goods. 
Figure 5
Source: author’s elaboration on UNComtrade data
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Some Central Asian countries – most notably Kazakhstan – are part 
of other regional initiatives, such as the Eurasian Economic Union, 
an economic union of five states in northern Eurasia (Belarus, Ka-
zakhstan, Russia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan), which might become a 
competitor in the global economic space. However, the trade com-
plementarity of these countries vis-à-vis one another is rather low 
(according to UNCTAD) (i.e. their export profiles do not match the 
import profiles of any others within the group), which means that a 
preferential trade agreement would not lead to any significant trade 
expansion or creation, and at the same time would not divert any 
of the trade of these Central Asian countries with other major trade 
partners.
Figure 6
Source: author’s elaboration on UNComtrade data
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Conclusion
OBOR is a major programme launched by the Chinese government 
in 2013 with many goals: to overcome domestic overcapacity in 
many industrial sectors through expansion on foreign markets, to 
support China’s economic development and growth in its transition 
from an investment-led model to a consumption-based economy, 
and to improve the security of trade routes, especially for energy 
products. It is particularly focused on infrastructure development, 
currently the major bottleneck to further economic integration 
across Eurasia, most notably between China and Central Asia, and 
between Central Asia and Europe. As such, it symbolises a histori-
cal juncture of stronger convergence of interests between China and 
Central Asia and greater competition between China and Europe 
in the region. At the same time, the strategic importance of energy 
supplies and political stability in the region are creating the politi-
cal conditions for China and Russia to cooperate and coordinate 
in Eurasia (as is already seen through the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation).

Policy	Recommendations	for	the	EU
Alessia Amighini
Since its announcement in 2013, the BRI has become the core of 
China’s economic diplomacy and has since then exerted a deep in-
fluence on most of the rest of the world’s diplomatic activities as 
well. Although the Chinese government officially prefers to call it 
an Initiative, inspired by a spirit of broad inclusiveness of many 
other countries all over the world, it should also in fact be regarded 
as the country’s new opening-up strategy, developed in response to 
changing domestic and international circumstances. 
The Initiative aims at integrating China into the global economy 
along much deeper avenues – far beyond trade and investment flows 
- than ever before. Along with the flourishing of bilateral agree-
ments signed by the Chinese government with individual partner 
countries since the 1990s (now up to 202 international investment 
agreements and 14 free trade agreements), aimed at reducing insti-
tutional barriers to trade and investment flows, the BRI intends to 
build a great Eurasian continent along lines that are very different 
from any other traditional paradigm of regional integration. While 
the world has so far experienced rule-based regional integration ar-
rangements, the Chinese way to regional integration tends to be less 
rule-based and more coalition-based along country-specific inter-
ests. As such, the BRI will have profound implications on interna-
tional economic and political relations for the rest of the world and 
more specifically for the EU, as the latter is the ultimate destination 
of the vast network of land routes and sea-lanes starting from vari-
ous Chinese provinces. 
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The BRI will likely contribute to economic development and 
regional stability in Eurasia from which both China and the EU 
could benefit in terms of new markets and energy security. There-
fore, Europe should consider the Initiative as a much broader vision 
than the simple improvement of physical and digital connectivity. 
To this aim, the following policy recommendations could be drawn 
for the EU:
• The broad scope of the BRI deserves a much higher politi-
cal-level dialogue between the EU and China, which is now 
absent in Europe. The EU-China Connectivity Platform is the 
main institutional arrangement where dialogues currently occur 
between the EU and China about how to coordinate large and 
long-term infrastructure projects, so that the Trans-European 
Transport Network (TEN-T) develops in a way consistent with 
the aims of the BRI to reach Europe from Asia. Since the early 
1990s, TEN-T has been the infrastructure policy at the Com-
munity level meant to support the functioning of the internal 
market through continuous and efficient networks in the fields of 
transport, energy and telecommunications. While China is very 
active in organizing summits and fora among the countries along 
the Belt and Road, the risk for Europe is to lose part of the deci-
sion-making power about its own internal goals and about its re-
lations with neighbouring countries. Moreover, paving the way 
to improved connectivity between the EU and China without 
progress on institutional barriers to trade that still exist between 
the two parties could exacerbate the currently large differences 
in bilateral market access.
• The EU has an historical responsibility to open a high-level 
dialogue on current competing initiatives for regional inte-
gration in Easter Europe and Central Asia. In fact, the BRI 
is a regional integration effort alternative to the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union (EEU) and an important absence in the BRI is the 
lack of relationships between the EUU and the EU. The BRI 
could open new opportunities for the EU to pursue its geostrate-
gic ambitions in Central Asia by deepening the EU-China stra-
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tegic partnership through cooperation in security fields, possibly 
paving the way to EU-Russia reconciliation. At the same time 
China, Russia, Ukraine and the EU have some common eco-
nomic and security interests in Eurasia that they could follow 
together in spite of different approaches. Under these conditions, 
it is better for European countries to try to find a common lan-
guage with former Soviet republics and China than to passively 
observe how the existing order is being replaced by something 
unfamiliar to European values and interests.
• Similarly, the EU should address the issue of the 16+1 mech-
anism as a source of possible inconsistencies for the Euro-
pean integration process. The “16+1” mechanism is a platform 
created in April 2012 by the Chinese leadership that seeks a 
stronger connection between China and the 16 CEE (Central and 
Eastern European) countries, namely Albania, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, 
Serbia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Nowadays, many previ-
ously agreed-upon joint 16+1 projects were given the OBOR la-
bel, which may pave the way for diverging perceptions towards 
EU internal integration policies. CEE countries have shown that 
they are able to adopt an active policy of cooperation with China 
and an issue has been raised about the status of Central Europe 
within the region and in the EU. There are evident discrepan-
cies between EU and non-EU members, especially in terms of 
rules and procedures related to investments and infrastructural 
projects. This poses serious challenges to the extent that EU and 
non-EU member countries develop common interests under the 
China-led 16+1 mechanism but perceive the divergent rules and 
regulations in EU vs. non-EU members as a source of bottle-
necks in their development process.
• The EU should seriously consider the consequences of the 
lack of a common framework for bilateral investment with 
China. In fact, the BRI will further accelerate Chinese invest-
ment activity in various infrastructure projects in European 
countries. Before the BRI was announced, China’s infrastructure 
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investment in Europe targeted individual EU countries and many 
non-EU members in Central and Eastern Europe, mainly in the 
manufacturing and services sectors. Recently, Chinese firms 
have started to invest in large infrastructure projects backed by 
their inclusion in the BRI project list. Coalition building around 
individual projects now tends to prevail over the legal rules and 
procedures that are at the heart of the EU competition policy, as 
the core principles around which the internal market has been 
developed. 
Although the BRI should be appreciated and not disregarded, Eu-
rope’s historical responsibility is to make multilateralism prevail 
against closed and competing initiatives towards regionalism. Only 
along those common avenues will Europe and China be able to 
build long-lasting cooperation, bridging thousands-of-kilometers-
long gaps for mutual benefits.
